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Summary findings
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They find that domestic acquisitions are similar to  profitable firms, on firms with low debt, and on firms
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Foreign  ownership  has been found to be correlated with industry productivity in many developing
and emerging  markets.'  This correlation  has been interpreted as implying  that openness  to foreign
investment  is an important growth-promoting  policy. It is unclear, however,  whether foreign  own-
ership leads to improved  performance  or whether high-growth  industries and better firms simply
attract more foreign  investment. If foreign  ownership  promotes  growth then the optimal policy is
to subsidize  foreign  investment. In contrast, if foreign  ownership  is a result of growth then there is
no role for tax incentives  or subsidies  to foreign  investors.
Foreign  ownership  might improve  performance  if foreigners  transfer better business  practices  or
technology  to the local firm. If these spill over to other local firms then foreign  ownership  might
enhance sectoral growth as well. Alternatively,  increased foreign  ownership  might be a result of
industry or firm growth. Some  sectors may naturally become multinational as they grow,  in order
to take advantage  of international markets and synergies.  In addition, if domestic access  to capital
is constrained then firms with high growth potential will attract relatively more foreign  capital. In
these cases,  while investment  facilitates  growth, the nationality of ownership  is unimportant. This
does not imply that  openness  to foreign  investment  is irrelevant to growth, only that there is no
role for subsidies  and tax holidays  targeting foreign  investors.
In this paper we study the pattern  of foreign acquisitions in an emerging economy,  Korea,
to examine  what type of firms and industries attract foreign  investment. If foreign  investors  have
different technology  from local investors  then we expect foreign  investment  to originate  from and to
target industries where foreign  firms have a comparative  advantage. We examine  all acquisitions  of
'Blomstrom (1989)  summarizes  the literature on positive spillovers  from FDI.
2Korean firms in 1998 and  1999 to determine whether international  transactions  were concentrated
in different industries  from domestic transactions.  Surprisingly, we find that  domestic acquisitions
in this period are very similar to foreign acquisitions by sector of both the target  and the acquiring
firm.  This  suggests that  the  incentives that  drive international  acquisitions  are similar to  those
that  drive domestic  acquisitions.  The main  difference between domestic  and  foreign acquisitions
is the  size of the  transactions.  The median reported  foreign transaction  value was over 65 percent
larger than  the median reported  domestic transaction.  We also find that  the industrial  distribution
of foreign acquisitions  in  Korea  mirrors  the  industrial  distribution  of multinational  operations,
suggesting that  certain  industries  may  naturally  be multinational.  Overall, these  results  suggest
that  internationalization  is a  form of consolidation,  which  is not  very  different  from  domestic
consolidation, but which occurs on a larger scale.
Second, using data  on foreign ownership from 1998 and 1999 and  firm characteristics  from the
preceding year  on nearly  all firms listed  on the  Korea  stock exchange  (KSE),  we examine which
sectors  and  firms have  attracted  foreign investment.  Any  correlation  we observe between  firm
characteristics  and foreign ownership must be a  result of foreign preferences because Korea only
opened to foreign investment at the end of 1997. We find that  foreign investment in Korea is focused
on larger and more profitable firms, and on firms with relatively low debt  ratios.  Foreign investment
is also  more likely when a greater  share of firm output  is exported.  The  evidence suggests that
foreign ownership gravitates  towards the  better  firms.
While our analysis does not directly answer the question of how foreign ownership affects growth,
it  does imply that  foreigners invest in and  acquire the  better  firms in high  growth industries  in
Korea.  This  means that  internationalization  in ownership is at  least  partly  a result  of firm and
industry growth.  In addition,  it implies that  studies which attempt  to measure the affect of foreign
3ownership on industry  and firm productivity  suffer from identification  problem  because the high
growth industries  and the better  firms attract  more foreign ownership.2
The  paper  is organized  as follows.  Section  2 examines the  literature  on  foreign ownership
and  growth,  and discusses foreign direct  investment in Korea in recent  years.  Section 3 presents
a theoretical  framework explaining foreign acquisitions.  Section 4 describes the  data.  Section 5
examines the theory empirically. Section 6 concludes.
2.  Foreign  Direct  Investment  and  Growth
Theory suggests that  technology diffusion through multinational  companies might be an important
source of growth for developing countries.3 There  is some empirical evidence that  is consistent
with the technology transfer argument.  Using industry  data,  Caves (1974) and  Globerman (1979)
test  whether  the  foreign share  of employment  contributes  to  labor  productivity  in  a production
function framework.  They find evidence of positive spillovers from foreign direct  investment (FDI)
in Australia  and Canada,  respectively. Using industry  data from Mexico, Blomstrom and Persson
(1983) and Blomstrom  (1986) find evidence of higher productivity  and  higher productivity  growth
in sectors with  more FDI. Borensztein et.  al.  (1998) find evidence of positive spillovers from FDI
in a cross section of countries, provided countries have a minimum level of human  capital.
These results, however, may be generated by reverse causality because FDI may be determined
by the level of growth of a sector or a country.  Indeed, using firm level data,  Haddad and Harrison
(1993) and  Aitken  and  Harrison  (1999) find no  evidence of positive  spillovers in  Morocco and
2Aitken and Harrison  (1999) argue a similar point.  Using plant  level data  on productivity  in Venezuela, they  find
that  foreign ownership  is positively  correlated  with  own-firm productivity,  but  not  with  productivity  growth.  They
interpret  this  as evidence that  foreigners invest  in more  productive  plants,  though  they  cannot  rule  out  that  there
are own-firm positive level effects.
3Findlay  (1978), Jovanovic  and Rob  (1989), Grossman  and Helpman  (1991).
4Venezuela, respectively.  This  suggests that  the  earlier findings may  be a  result  of high-growth
industries  and countries attracting  more foreign investment.
Rather  than  examining spillovers, we look at what type of firms and industries  foreigners invest
in.  Our data  set provides a unique  opportunity  to  evaluate what  type  of firm foreigners acquire
because Korea  greatly limited  foreign ownership until  1998. This  means that  any correlation  we
find between foreign ownership in1998 and  1999 and  firm characteristics  in 1997 is not a result of
foreign ownership.  We examine whether  foreign investment results  from firm- and  sector-specific
growth.
2.1.  Foreign  Direct  Investment  in Korea
Until the financial crisis started  in October 1997, the Korean corporate  sector was virtually  closed
to foreign investment.  Individual  foreigners could obtain  only 5 percent  of the outstanding  shares
of a company, and overall, foreigners could hold a maximum of 20 percent.  In December 1997, the
limit was raised to 50 percent  for an individual  investor, and 55 percent  for foreigners collectively.
In May 1998, the limits on foreign ownership in most of the corporate  sector were eliminated.  In
addition,  foreign investors can now buy up to  a third  of the company without  approval from the
Board of Directors,  i.e. hostile takeovers are permitted.
The new foreign investment regime led to a boom in FDI. Figure 1 plots the aggregates for 1994
to  1999, which show a large jump  in the  last three  years.4 The three  industries  experiencing the
largest gains were paper, chemicals, and electronics (Table 1).
4In Korean  won,  FDI  shows  an  even more  rapid  expansion  in  1997 and  1998,  as  a  result  of the  won's  large
depreciation.
5Figure 1: Foreign Direct  Investnent in Korea
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The changes in the legal limits to foreign ownership, combined with the large supply of company
shares  following the  financial crisis,  makes the  Korean  sample an  excellent choice to  study  the
investment  patterns  of foreigners.  Within  a  very  short  period  of time  a  number  of companies
changed hands.  This natural  experiment allows us to test several hypotheses that  we derive in the
next section.
3. Theoretical  Framework
Existing  theories  of foreign direct  investment highlight  the importance  of intangible  firm-specific
assets  and location  in making the  decision to choose FDI  over other  means of servicing a foreign
market.5 In general,  two conditions  should  be  satisfied  if a  firm  is better  off investing  in the
country  than  exporting.  (i) There is a locational advantage to operating  abroad,  perhaps because
of transport  costs or  tariffs.  (ii) The  investing firm has  an  advantage  over host  country  firms,
for  example,  in technology,  managerial  skills,  or brand  name  and  marketing.  FDI  theory  has
traditionally  focused on  greenfield investment,  where  the  intangible  asset  is assumed  to  be the
5Markusen  (1995)  surveys  the literature.
6property of the parent.
In this  paper we focus on a specific type  of direct  investment,  foreign acquisitions, which are
likely to  be undertaken  for similar reasons to  greenfield investment.  In addition  to location and
technology, foreign acquisitions may also be undertaken  in order to gain access to assets held by a
host-country  firm.  We therefore incorporate  the possibility of firm-specific assets that  local firms
have and that  foreign firms need in order to market their products  effectively.
We model the decision to invest in a local firm, taking  into consideration the  effects on parent
sales as a result  of firm-specific assets  of the  host country  target  firm, and  the  effect of parent-
specific assets.  In evaluating the  return  on the  investment,  a firm will incorporate  the  expected
effect on own company and  subsidiary  profits when purchasing  a  company.  A  foreign firm will
acquire a large share of a domestic firm if the value of the acquisition is greater than  its value to a
domestic company. We assume the investment can change the value of each firm (target  and parent)
because of synergies resulting from the  use of intangible assets.  The net value of the investment is
the gain from acquisition above the cost of acquiring the firm at  the market price.  The net value is
the change in value of the host-country  firm plus the change in the value of the home country firm
as a result of the investment.  Acquiring a foreign firm is optimal if the following condition holds:
XAV;I  + AVF > XAVD 1 + AVD.  (3.1)
where x  is ownership share,  AVF/ is the change in  the  value of the  acquired  firm given foreign
investment,  AVF is the change in the  value of the foreign parent firm, AVDI  is the change in the
value of the acquired  firm given domestic investment,  and AVD is the  change in the  value of the
domestic parent  firm given the investment.  The left-hand side is the value of the acquisition to the
foreigner and  the right-hand  side is the value of the same acquisition to a domestic bidder.
Hence, for the foreign investor to succeed in acquiring the firm, she must offer at  least as much
7as the domestic investor. Equation (3.1) yields two hypotheses regarding foreign acquisitions. First,
foreign direct  investment  (FDI) is more likely if foreign acquisition boosts the  local firm's profits
by more than  a domestic acquisition would (AV;I  - AVLI >  0).  For example,  the value of the
target  firm  will increase  if the  foreign investor transfers  technology  or managerial  skills to  the
domestic firm.  This suggests that  foreign investors will target  firms in industries  where foreigners
have better  technology or skills.  Hence, the  industrial  distribution  of foreign acquisition targets
should be different from the industrial  distribution  of domestic acquisition targets.
Similarly, if acquisition helps the foreign firm's sales in the local market by more than  it would
boost  another domestic firm's sales, then foreign direct investment is more likely (AVF  - AVD > 0).
That  is, FDI in a host country firm may help the foreign parent's  profits by improving access to
the  market.  In this  case, the  acquiring firm is likely to  be from an industry  that  wants greater
access to the Korean market.  This implies that  foreign acquirers are likely to come from different
industries than  their domestic counterparts.
Whether  technology transfer  or access to  the  Korean market  is the  purpose  of investment is
difficult to distinguish empirically because parents  and  affiliates tend  to be in the same industry.
Hence the first hypothesis is that  if an intangible asset, be it technology transfer or access to the Ko-
rean market, is the main reason for investment then foreign acquisitions and domestic acquisitions
are likely to be in different industries.
Second, if domestic  access to capital  is constrained  or domestic firms tend  to  be small then
foreign acquisition will be more likely in larger companies. If domestic firms are capital constrained
then  the  right  hand  side of equation  (3.1) will be  small when the  transaction  size is large,  i.e.
there  will be no domestic bidder.  Similarly, if domestic firms are smaller than  foreign firms, then
there will be fewer domestic bidders when the target firm is large. The second hypothesis therefore
sstipulates  that  transaction  size will be a key determinant  of foreign investment.
4.  Data
We first  examine mergers  and  acquisitions in  Korea  (December  1997 to  July  1999) to  look for
consistency with the hypotheses derived above.  Since the ownership limit to foreign investors was
raised to 50% in December 1997, the ownership data for 1998 and 1999 is particularly  appropriate for
hypotheses testing.  Data on mergers and acquisitions in Korea are from Securities Data Corporation
(2000).  The data  include the  4 digit SIC code of the target  and  the acquiring  firm and  detailed
information  about  the  transaction.  We supplement  these  data  with  data  on  631 firms that  were
listed on the Korea  Stock Exchange in 1998.6
The firm-level financial data for 1997 are primarily  from the Worldscope database.  The World-
scope database  covers publicly traded  companies in 51 countries.  Foreign investment  is from the
Handbook  of Listed  Companies, Daewoo Securities  (1998 and  1999).  In cases where the  World-
scope data were missing or incomplete, we collected additional  company information  from Wisenet
Korea.7 This  internet  server provides detailed  financial information,  including income statements
and balance sheets, for listed companies in Korea. We use 1997 financial data  because this is what
investors observed at  the time they  made their investment.  In addition,  this  means there  is very
little possibility of an effect of foreign ownership on firm characteristics.
We also collect data  on business group affiliation, as this  is recognized in previous  studies to
be an  important  feature  of the  Korean  corporate  sector  (Claessens,  Djankov,  and  Lang,  2000).
6fIn January  1998 760 firms were listed  on the Korean  Stock Exchange.  Financial  data  for 28 firms which filed for
bankruptcy  in 1998 were unavailable.  Another  101 firms reported  incomplete  ownership  or unconsolidated  financial
data.
'The  data  were downloaded  from their  website:  www.wsn.co.kr.
9Information on company affiliation with the top 30 chaebol is provided by the Korean Fair Trade
Commission on an annual basis. We use group-affiliation data from the  1994-1997 lists of business
groups.  This is because the 1998 list contained a number of ownership changes, which would have
biased our results.  Several debt-ridden  business groups were forced to sell bankrupt  firms in 1997
and  1998, which were in  some cases subsumed  into larger  business groups  and/or  taken  over by
foreigners. A firm's openness to foreign investment is thus related  to its membership at the time of
divestiture.  The list of chaebol is fairly robust  from 1994 to 1997, with the same chaebol occupying
the top 25 spots throughout  the period.  There was some variation among the bottom  five chaebol,
with three  chaebol leaving the list by 1996 or 1997. In the interest of comprehensiveness, we follow
all companies affiliated with the 33 chaebol that  appear on the Korean Fair Trade Commission lists
in 1994-1997.
5. The  Pattern  of  FDI
5.1.  Mergers  and  Acquisitions
The theoretical framework suggests that  if technology transfer  or access to local distribution  net-
works were important,  then  the  industries  of targets  of foreign investment  and  the  industries  of
foreign acquiring firms and domestic acquiring firms should be different.  Figures 2 and 3 show the
percentage  of foreign and  domestic  transactions  by target  industry  and  parent  industry,  respec-
tively.  In general foreign investors target  firms in similar industries  to  Korean firms.  The simple
correlation among 2-digit SIC industries  is 0.84 and the rank correlation  is 0.88.  The industries of
the acquiring firms are also very similar, with a simple correlation of 0.91 and a rank correlation of
0.82.  This  suggests that  to the extent  that  international  synergies exist, they  are broadly similar
to domestic synergies. Still, it is worth noting that  some industries tend  to attract  somewhat more
10foreign direct  investment,  such as chemicals and machinery; while others, such as primary  metals
and  petroleum  tend  to attract  more domestic investors.
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One major difference between international  transactions  and domestic transactions  is their size.
Of the 73 domestic transactions  for which information was available, the median transaction  value
was $35 million. Of the 109 foreign acquisitions for which transaction data was available the median
value was $58 million. Foreigners behave similarly to domestic investors, except  that  they  operate
on a larger scale. This is consistent  with the predictions of the model if domestic firms are capital
constrained  or are in general smaller than  international  investors.  In these  circumstances,  large
transactions  are more likely to be uncontested  domestically.
11While foreign takeovers look roughly similar to domestic takeovers by industry, they also mirror
world industry.  Table 2 shows the  industrial distribution  of the top  100 multinational  companies
(MNCs) and of Korean acquisitions.  Of the  10 main industries where multinationals  are prevalent,
7 were in  the  top  10 industries  for international  takeovers of Korean firms.  This  suggests that
certain  industries, especially electronics and chemicals, are more likely to have foreign ownership.
Moreover, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 3, electronics and chemicals are also the top two
value-added industries in Korea in 1995, implying that  these are important  growth industries where
Korean technology is not lacking.
In sum, the industrial distribution of foreign acquisitions in Korea is similar to that  of Korean do-
mestic acquisitions and to the industrial distribution  of multinational companies worldwide. Thus,
the  same industries  that  benefit from national  economies of scale also benefit from international
economies of scale. One difference between domestic and international  acquisitions is size, as inter-
national  transactions  are larger.  This suggests that  there is a two-stage process of consolidation,
first firms consolidate nationally,  then  they  consolidate internationally.  In addition,  some high-
growth industries  such as chemical and electronics are more prone to international  consolidation.
Next, we evaluate firm level data  on ownership to  get a better  understanding  of what  foreigners
bought in Korea following  the 1997 financial crisis and the subsequent removal of barriers to foreign
ownership.
5.2.  Explaining  foreign  ownership
In this  section, we examine how firm- as opposed to  industry-level characteristics  affect foreign
ownership.  Our  focus is on  ownership by  large  foreign investors,  but  the  available  ownership
data  give total  foreign holdings of each firm.  In order to identify firms that  have a  single major
foreign holder we make several adjustments.  First, we assume foreign direct investment is present if
12foreign ownership exceeds 10 percent. Should foreign ownership be below 10 percent we assume it is
portfolio investment.  Second, we consider only firms that  are also in the merger and acquisition data
from Securities Data  Corporation  (2000) or have a foreign ownership share exceeding 25 percent.
67 of the  103 firms with FDI in 1999 fall into this category.
Table 3 presents  summary  statistics  of the  ownership data  on  publicly-traded  firms in Korea
in 1998 and 1999. The 1999 sample is smaller because several dozen firms went bankrupt  or were
delisted from the Korea Stock Exchange in 1999. In the  1998 sample,  156 firms (25 percent of the
sample) had  foreign ownership exceeding 10 percent.  The summary  statistics  suggest that  firms
that  attracted  significant foreign investment were larger and more profitable  than  the average firm
in the sample in both  1998 and 1999. In contrast,  the characteristics  of firms that  attracted  only
foreign portfolio investment (0<FI<10)  were similar to the sample averages in both  1998 and 1999.
To evaluate how these  variables affect the decision to  make a  large investment,  we estimate
the likelihood of receiving foreign investment in excess of 10 percent.  Specifically, the dependent
variable, Fl,  is a binomial variable and equals one if foreign ownership exceeds 10 percent and zero
otherwise.  The estimating equation  is
Pr(FI  =  1) = F(X*)
Pr(FI  =  O)  = 1-F(X*),
where X* is a vector of characteristics of the firms in the sample, including firm size, firm profitabil-
ity, firm debt, and access to distribution.  We measure size by log of assets and log of sales (ASSET,
SALE), profitability  by the  ratio of earnings before interest  and taxes  (EBIT)  to total  sales, and
we proxy for access to distribution  channels and government preference with  a dummy for mem-
bership in a top 33 chaebol (CHAEBOL).  We use debt-asset  ratios  instead  of debt-equity ratios
(FDEBT) because several firms report negative book value of equity. We expect the coefficients on
13ASSET, SALE, EBIT,  and CHAEBOL to  be positive, as they  should increase the  probability of
foreign investment.  If foreigners buy only the  better  firms then the coefficient on FDEBT  should
be negative.  Alternatively, over-indebted firms may be more likely to be vulnerable  to takeover,
suggesting the coefficient might be positive. We also include (2-digit SIC) industry  fixed effects in
all regressions,
The first three columns of Table 4A report the coefficient  estimates from this regression equation.
They were estimated using both Logit and Probit.  The results are very similar in both cases so we
report  only the  Logit estimates.  All three  variables-size, profitability, and chaebol membership-
increase the likelihood of foreign investment. EBIT and DEBT are negatively correlated (the simple
correlation coefficient  is -0.37). When debt is not included the coefficient on profitability is positive
and highly significant.  Firms  with greater  debt are significantly less likely to  receive substantial
foreign investment,  suggesting that  highly indebted  firms,  although  perhaps  in  greater  need  of
foreign capital, do not attract  foreign ownership. 8
Next, we look for evidence on capital shortages using data  on chaebol affiliation.  We include
business group data since domestic investment in Korea often comes via the firm's group affiliation,
as most chaebol have affiliated banks  and non-bank financial companies.  If groups  have limited
access to capital, then we expect the group debt variable to positively impact  foreign ownership of
their affiliates. We include the log of group assets (GASSET) and group debt-asset ratios (GDEBT).
We expect group  assets to negatively impact  foreign ownership since these groups  can subsidize
firms more easily.
8Kang  and Stulz (1997) evaluate  the effect of firm characteristics  on foreign ownership  in Japan  and find similar
results  for firm  size and leverage.  They  interpret  this as  evidence that  foreign  investors  do not  hold the  market
portfolio.  Our  results  suggest  that  some of the  relation  that  they  are  picking up  is because  ownership  data  also
contains merger and acquisition activity,  which should not  be expected  to mirror  the market  portfolio.
14The results are reported in the fourth column of Table 4A. The group variables have the expected
signs. Firms acquired by foreigners are more likely to belong to debt-ridden  groups and less likely
to  belong to  groups with large assets.  This suggests that  firms belonging to  capital  constrained
groups are more likely to have foreign ownership.
In the final column of Table 4A, we include the export share of the firm's output in the regression
equation.  There are two reasons why export share might positively impact foreign ownership. First,
firms with a large export share may benefit more from foreign ownership if foreigners have greater
access to global markets.  This follows the case in the theoretical section where the foreign parent
adds more value to the target  than a domestic parent would add.  Second, foreigners may have better
information about firms which also serve their home market.  This is akin to a lower transaction  cost
because less information about the target  needs to be acquired by the foreign parent, which implies
that  a Korean exporting firm is more likely to be acquired than  an otherwise similar Korean firm.
We find that  firms that  export a large share of output  are more likely to attract  foreign investment.
Next  we use the  1999 data  to  test  the  robustness  of these findings and  further  distinguish
portfolio investors from merger and acquisition activity.  First, we examine how firm characteristics
affect the  likelihood of receiving positive  foreign investment,  i.e., the  dependent  variable is 1 if
foreign ownership is greater than  0. Second, we estimate the likelihood of receiving foreign portfolio
investment,  defined as foreign investment  between 0 and  10 percent.  Third,  we  use the  same
binomial variable defined above (foreign investment greater than  10 percent) on the 1999  ownership
data.  And finally, we evaluate a more restrictive  binomial variable, which is 1 only if the firm is
known to  have  been  a  target  of foreign acquisition in  the  past  or  has foreign ownership share
exceeding 25 percent.
The results are reported in Table 4B. The first column reports the results for the likelihood of
15receiving positive foreign investment.  It  suggests that  smaller and  more leveraged firms are less
likely to receive foreign investment.  The second column  reports  the results  when the  dependent
variable is foreign portfolio ownership. It suggests that  firms which receive foreign portfolio invest-
ment  are not very different from the  average firm.  To the  extent that  this represents  the average
foreign portfolio investor, it  suggests that  foreign portfolio investors  choose the  average market
portfolio, as theory predicts.
The third  column in Table  4B examines the  likelihood of receiving foreign investment above
10 percent.  The signs and  significance of all of the  variables, except  for the  variable indicating
membership in a chaebol, are robust  to the  1999 data.  The  group debt  and  asset variables were
never significant, suggesting that  the  surviving indebted  groups  were not  capital  constrained  in
1999. This may also be simply because the most indebted groups drop out of the 1999 sample.
The last column reports the results when the subset that contains firms acquired by foreigners  is
used. Size and debt again appear to be the main determinants  of attracting  large foreign ownership.
Comparing  columns 3 and  4 with  columns  1 and  2, exporting  is only positive  and  significant
when  the  dependent  variable is extensive  foreign ownership.  This  suggests that  informational
asymmetries, which should be present for both portfolio and  direct investment,  are not the reason
that  foreign investors choose firms that  export.  Rather,  the  parent  firm provides  an intangible
asset to  the  target,  perhaps  in international  distribution  and  marketing,  that  another  domestic
firm would not.
6.  Conclusion
In this  paper,  we examine how firm and  industry  characteristics  affect foreign ownership.  We
find that  foreign acquisitions  are larger  than  domestic  acquisitions  but  are similar  to  domestic
16acquisitions  by industry.  We also find that  foreign takeovers of Korean  firms are in  the  same
industries  where the  world's  largest multinational  corporations  operate,  implying that  there is a
higher equilibrium level of internationalization,  as characterized  by sales and ownership, for these
industries.  Together, these results suggest that  internationalization  is a form of consolidation, which
is not very different from domestic consolidation, but which occurs on a larger scaLe.
Using data on nearly all firms listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, we find that foreign investors
disproportionately  target  larger and more profitable firms, exporting firms, and firms with low debt
ratios.  We interpret  this  as evidence that  the correlation  between foreign ownership and growth
found in earlier work may be the result of foreigners investing in better  and bigger firms, and not
a result of technology transfer  from foreign investment.
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19Table  1:  Foreign  Direct  Investment  in  Manufacturing
(Accepted Cases, in mn.  U.S. dollars)
1997  1998  Growth Rate
Food  851  718  -15.6
Textile and Clothing  85  18  -79.2
Paper  and Lumber  196  1,644  788.9
Chemicals  235  755  222.0
Petrochemicals  3  0.8  -70.5
Fertilizer  - 0.2  -
Medicine  44  134  207.2
Cerammics  54  279  419.6
Metals  14  7  -50.1
Machinary  166  587  253.7
Electricity  and  Electronics  291  1,377  373.2
Transport  Equipment  395  180  -54.4
Other  Manufacturing  16  33  108.6
Total  2,348  5,734  144.2
Source: Ministry of Finance and  Economics.
20Table  2:  Industrial  Distribution  of Foreign  Acquisitions
A:  Top  10 Industries*  of 100  largest  Multinational  Corporations
Industry  Top 100  MNCs  Percent  of Total
Electronics  17  0.213
Chemicals  16  0.200
Automotive  14  0.175
Food  and  Beverages  12  0.150
Diversified  4  0.050
Telecommunications  5  0.063
Trading  4  0.050
Machinery  and  Engineering  2  0.025
Metals  3  0.038
Construction  3  0.038
Total  80  1.000
B:  Top  Ten  Industries  Involving  Foreign  Acquisitions  in  Korea
Acquisitions  in Korea Percent  of Total
Chemicals  25  0.185
Electronics  19  0.141
Machinery  19  0.141
Trading  15  0.111
Telecommunications  13  0.096
Services  13  0.096
Food  and  beverages  10  0.074
Automotive  9  0.067
Paper  and  Allied  products  7  0.052
Textile  mill  products  5  0.037
Total  135  1.000
Source:  United Nations 1998, SDC, and Korea Statistical  Yearbook 1997.
*  Excludes petroleum.  Table continues on the next page
21Table  2 continued
C: Value  Added  in Korea
Korean  Value Added
Electronics  24.99
Chemical  and  allied  products  14.85
Motor  vehicles  and  equipment  13.08
Industrial  machinery  12.89
Primary  metals  10.92
Textile  mill  products  8.82
Mining  7.71
Fabricated  metals  7.45
Rubber  and  misc  6.28
Apparel  and  other  5.25
Source: Korea Statistical  Yearbook 1997.
22Table  3:  Summary  Statistics,  1998  and  1999  ownership  data
(1997  sales  and  assets  data  in  mn.  $US)
1998  1999
O<FI<10  FI>10  Total  10>FI>O  FI>10  Total
Number of observations  254  156  631  306  103  525
Average Foreign  3.09  22.69  6.96  2.37  26.33  6.54
Share  0.40  0.25  1.00  0.58  0.20  1.00
Average firm assets  976  4971  1850  1687  5006  2006
Minimum firm assets  17.1  31.1  16.0  17.1  32.3  16.0
Average firm sales  827  1943  893  882  1813  897
Minimum firm sales  13.0  23.9  6.5  6.5  15.8  6.5
Average firm debt/assets  0.72  0.75  0.74  0.71  0.70  0.70
Average firm EBIT*/Sales  0.02  0.06  0.01  0.03  0.19  0.03
E  Earnings before interest  and taxes
23Table  4:  Explaining  foreign  investment
A:  Regressions  on  1998  Ownership  Data
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
ASSET  0.78***  0.66***  0.71***  0.71***
(0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.10)
SALES  0.80***
(0.10)
EBIT  1.11  1.40  1.15  1.18  1.22
(0.92)  (0.97)  (0.99)  (1.0)  (1.01)
CHAEBOL  1.34***  1.56***  1.66***
(0.25)  (0.44)  (0.45)
FDEBT  -2.16***  -1.96***  -3.02***  -3.23***  -3.32***
(0.73)  (0.71)  (0.77)  (0.78)  (0.79)
GDEBT  2.92*  3.03*
(1.53)  (1.55)




Fraction  Correct  0.79  0.78  0.80  0.81  0.81
Number of Obs.  631  631  631  631
R-Square  0.22  0.22  0.27  0.27  0.24
24Table  4 continued
B:  Regressions  on  1999  Ownership  Data
(FI>0)  (O<FI<10)  (FI>10)  (FI>251MA)
ASSET  1.14***  0.07  0.77***  0.93***
(0.16)  (0.08)  (0.11)  (0.14)
EBIT  -0.83  -0.73  2.29**  2.11
(0.99)  (0.69)  (1.13)  (1.41)
CHAEBOL  0.81*  0.18  0.30  0.12
(0.42)  (0.75)  (0.31)  (0.32)
FDEBT  -2.89***  0.19  -3.61***  -4,13***
0.89  (0.28)  (0.97)  (1.21)
EXPORT  -0.004  -0.009***  0.01***  0.01***
0.004  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.006)
Fraction Correct  0.83  0.62  0.82  0.89
Number of Obs.  525  525  525  525
R-Square  0.27  0.06  0.21  0.20
Significant at  the  ***1% level, ** 5% level, and  *10% level.
Standard  errors in parentheses.
All regressions run  with industry dummies (not reported).
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